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   In this paper, we test two different kinds of bias; the favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog and the 
home team bias, and distinguish between the two, using a distinctive feature of the Australian Football 
League (AFL), that many games are played on neutral grounds. This is the first empirical study, to the 
best of our knowledge, to make a clear distinction between the two types of bias. We conduct our tests 
by subjecting 2001-2004 data for the AFL to detailed scrutiny, using standard econometric weak-form 
efficiency models of point spread and fixed odds betting markets. Where the results suggest the 
presence of a bias, we test potential profitability via betting simulation. We are able to reject the 
existence of any significant pure favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog bias in either market, and to 
demonstrate the existence of a significant bias in favor of teams with an apparent home ground 
advantage in games played outside Victoria in the point spread market and in the fixed odds market 
during 2002, 2004 and the period as a whole. Games in Melbourne and in Geelong are free of such a 
bias (except for 2003 in the point spread market in Geelong). Betting simulations which attempt to 
exploit these inefficiencies yield modest profits. 
 







   Risk aversion is a standard assumption in traditional economic theory. Yet, the generality of risk 
aversion seems to stop at betting markets, where most of the literature confirms the tendency of 
bettors to under-bet favorites and over-bet longshots/underdogs
2 relative to their chances of winning, 
this bias being known as the favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog bias.
3 Only a handful of papers, 
all using data on odds betting systems, present an empirical exception to this bias, i.e., a reverse 
favorite-longshot bias.
4  
      The concept of home ground advantage has long been recognized as a contributing factor for 
sporting success.
5 Schwartz & Barsky (1977) proposed three explanations why the home ground 
advantage exists: learning factors (stadium and playing surface familiarity
6), travel factors (physical 
and mental fatigue, disruption of routine) and crowd factors (social support). Courneya & Carron 
(1991) suggest also possible referee bias. The absolute extent of influence of the three factors varies 
from one sport to another. 
   Our goal in this paper is to disentangle the favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog biases, on the one 
hand, from any extant home team bias, on the other. This would be a novel contribution to the 
literature. Our analysis is based on four seasons of Australian Rules Football, 2001-2004. 
   We test the two dominant betting methods in team sports; the "Point spread" (also known as "line") 
wagering market, which is the dominant form of wagering on basketball and American football 
contests
7, and the fixed odds win (also known as "win") wagering market, which predominates in US 
baseball.
8 
9 As it happens, both of these markets operate on Australian Rules Football, yet economic 
literature relating to "Aussie Rules" is quite limited.
10
   We use a straight-forward method to test for the existence of these biases, facilitated by the fact that 
many games in our data sample are played on neutral grounds, so that the home ground bias is 
evidently absent. Given the number of games played on neutral grounds, we are able to test 
unambiguously for the existence of any significant favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog bias in either 





   Following the specific home ground character of the AFL, as explained below, we divide the data 
set into four categories, according to the nature of a priori home ground advantage and location of the 
relevant game; games played on neutral grounds regardless of location, games played outside Victoria 
where there is a priori home ground advantage, games played in Melbourne where there is a priori 
home ground advantage and games played in Geelong where Geelong Cats always has an a priori 
home ground advantage.
11 The reason for dividing the data set into three where there is a priori home 
ground advantage is that the distances traveled and/or the extent of crowd support vary considerably 
as between these three groups of locations. While there is travel symmetry vis-à-vis games played in 
Melbourne and outside Victoria, crowd support differs considerably. Thus, for example, the Sydney 
Swans were originally the South Melbourne Swans and thus continue to maintain a supporter base in 
Melbourne. Also, part of the Brisbane Lions is based on a former Melbourne team, the Fitzroy Lions. 
Finally, teams from outside Victoria play far more games in Victoria than do Victorian teams outside 
their state. Consequently, the home ground advantage enjoyed by Melbourne teams is likely to be less 
than that enjoyed by home teams playing outside Victoria. These assertions are supported by the data 
shown below in Table 2.  
   Our most clear-cut finding is that both betting markets are weak-form efficient when games are 
played either on neutral grounds or in Melbourne. Thus, we are able to reject the existence of any 
significant pure favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog bias in either market and any home or away 
team bias in games played in Melbourne. On this basis, we would imply that any bias(es) found in 
other subsets of the data would most likely be due to a home or away team bias and not due to a 
favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog bias. We demonstrate the existence of a significant bias in 
favor of teams with an apparent home ground advantage in games played outside Victoria in both 
markets for some seasons and the whole period, while games in same Geelong results are similar in 
the line market but the fixed odds market appears to be efficient. Betting simulations which attempt to 
exploit these inefficiencies yield modest profits. 
   The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: A summary of the basics of Australian Rules 
football, home ground advantage and betting markets relevant to an understanding of this paper is 





section 4 discusses the weak efficiency econometric tests and the betting simulations, while section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 




   Australian Rules football is a high scoring, continuous-action game. For the 2001-2004 seasons, the 
average game score per team was 95 points, with a minimum of 25, a maximum of 196, and a 
standard error of 28. Each team has 18 players on the field at any given time and 4 substitutes are 
available for unrestricted, repeated substitutions as deemed fit by the team coach. 
   The home and away season comprises 176 games played over 22 weekly rounds of eight games 
each, between 16 teams. Following this is a final series between the top eight teams. The two 
surviving teams from this phase play for the premiership title in what is known as the "Grand Final". 
In total, 185 games are played in an entire season.
12 In 2005, the home and away season had a total 
attendance of 6,283,788, and the average per game attendance of 35,703 was the third highest of any 
professional sports league in the world (http://www.answers.com/topic/australian-football-league). 
      The AFL is a national league which began as the Victorian Football League. The states and 
territories within Australia are not equally represented in the AFL; Victoria has ten representative 
teams, South Australia and Western Australia – two each, and Queensland and New South Wales – 
one each. Tasmania, Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory are not currently represented 
although games are occasionally played in these areas.  
 
2.2 Home grounds 
 
   Except for the Geelong Cats, all the other teams in the AFL derived from Melbourne and initially 





been accompanied by a policy of stadium consolidation in Melbourne. Thus, it has not been true for 
some years that each team has its own stadium. Of the sixteen teams that make up the AFL, only three 
have stadia which are uniquely home grounds, where it may be said that they have an advantage; the 
Brisbane Lions, the Sydney Swans and the Geelong Cats.
13 All the other teams play at grounds shared 
with one or more teams. Thus, dealing with the home advantage in the AFL requires further care and 
a compliment to the official home designation is necessary. Whenever we refer to home teams as 
either subsets of the data or dummy variables, we mean teams with an a priori home ground 
advantage. Teams which are officially designated as home teams but have no a priori home ground 
advantage are referred to as Neutral.
14 Data concerning the different grounds in the AFL are presented 
in Table 1. We can see that 53% of the games during 2001-2004 seasons were played in Melbourne, 
Victoria.  
 
Table 1 Home grounds in 2001-2004 AFL seasons 
No. of games State/County City Home teams Ground
96 (12.97%)  South Australia  Adelaide  Adelaide Crows, Port Adelaide Power  AAMI Stadium (aka Football Park) 
53 (7.16%)  Queensland  Brisbane  Brisbane Lions  Gabba 
34 (4.59%)  Victoria  Melbourne  Carlton Blues, Western Bulldogs  Optus Oval (aka Princess Park) 
184 (24.86%)  Victoria  Melbourne  Collingwood Magpies, Essendon Bombers,  
Richmond Tigers, Kangaroos, Melbourne  
Demons, Hawthorn Hawks 
M.C.G
15
177 (23.92%)  Victoria  Melbourne  Essendon Bombers, Western Bulldogs,  
St Kilda Saints, Kangaroos 
Telstra Dome (aka Docklands  
Stadium, Colonial Stadium) 
89 (12.03%)  Western Australia  Perth  Fremantle Dockers, West Coast Eagles  Subiaco Oval 
32 (4.32%)  Victoria  Geelong  Geelong Cats  Skilled Stadium (aka Shell  
Stadium, Kardinia Park) 
41 (5.54%)  New South Wales  Sydney  Sydney Swans  S.C.G 
11 (1.49%)  New South Wales  Sydney  Sydney Swans  Telstra Stadium (aka Olympic  
Stadium, Stadium Australia) 
11 (1.49%)  Tasmania  Launceston  Hawthorn Hawks  Aurora Stadium (aka York Park)* 
11 (1.49%)  Australian Capital  
Territory 
Canberra  Kangaroos  Manuka Oval* 
1 (0.14%)  Northern Territory  Darwin  Western Bulldogs  Marrara Stadium* 
* These grounds are part of the AFL's policy to play games also in other states. 
 
   We report an official home ground advantage (as measured by average winning margin of home 
teams) of 8.63 points during 2001-2004, similar to Bailey & Clarke's (2004) 8 points over the last 110 
seasons. When we test the real home ground advantage in our data, we report an advantage of 13.43 
points, similar to Bailey & Clarke's 14.1 points when opponents travel from interstate to play. 
Moreover, because of the AFL teams’ unique geographic division, as mentioned above, we divide the 





and the results are presented in Table 2. We report a real home ground advantage of only 1.15 points 
in Melbourne, 10.87 in Geelong and 21.4 outside Victoria. This means, basically, that grounds in 
Melbourne almost do not provide a home ground advantage.
16
 
Table 2 AFL's home ground advantage 
For real (official) home teams during 2001-2004. 
Subset No. of games Home win % Home advantage (points)
All games  483 (740)  62.9 (59.2)  13.43 (8.63) 
Melbourne 174  48.9  1.15 
Geelong 31 58.1  10.87 




   Legalized betting in Australia is one of the largest industries nation-wide, involving both amateur 
and professional bettors. During 1997/8 82% of all adults participated in a gambling activity 
(Productivity Commission, 1999). In 2002/3, total gambling expenditure within Australia was A$15.3 
billion (The Australian National University, 2004), approximately 2% of GDP. Sports betting 
comprise 0.5% of the above amount, while racing is 12.3%. 
   In point spread wagering on most sports, bookmakers offer bettors odds that a team will win by 
more than a certain number of points, known as the line. A typical line wager in the AFL requires that 
the bettor risk $1 for the chance to receive around $1.9 if successful.
17 This $1.9-for-$1 dividend 
requires that bettors must pick winners in 52.63 percent of bets to break even.
18 
19  
   In fixed odds wagering, the bookmaker offers to pay a ratio of the amount wagered if a certain team 
wins. The fixed odds wager in the AFL requires that the bettor risk $1 for the chance to receive a 
fixed sum if successful.
20 As expressed below, the bookmaker sets odds to earn around five percent of 
the total amount bet if his book is balanced.
21 Therefore the bettor must pick around 52.5 percent of 
winners to break even.
22
   Bookmakers’ lines/odds are generally posted each Tuesday for each of the games played per week, 





between the posting of the odds and the commencement of the game. The initial line/odds are based 
on the bookmaker's goal to evenly divide the amount bet between the sides of the bet, so his earns are 
around 5% of the total amount bet with certainty. Thereafter the bookmaker adjusts the line/odds.
23 
There is no consensus in the literature whether these adjustments are made to reflect the collective 
judgment of gamblers about the outcome or because the bookmakers are setting prices in order to 
exploit bettors' biases. Levitt (2004), using data on prices and quantities of bets placed, found support 
for the latter hypothesis; i.e., that bookmakers do not try to set prices to equalize the amount of money 
bet on either side of a wager.  




3. The data 
 
   The data used in this paper are derived from publicly available sources,
25 i.e., internet-based sports 
statistical information. Thus, the game data come from http://www.afl.com.au and 
http://stats.rleague.com/afl/seas/season_idx.html, while the odds and lines are from 
http://www.sportsbetting.com.au, http://www.goalsneak.com.au and http://www.centrebet.com.
26 Our 
data consist of game performances, dates, grounds, odds and lines. We use data from the 2001 to 2004 
seasons, for a total of 740 games (all home and away games plus the finals), and 1480 team 
observations. Line data are missing for 86 games, since the bookmakers do not publish a line in a 
match where both teams have equal (or very close) betting odds.
27
   In each team observation we denote the team from whose perspective the spread and result are 
defined as the team of record. We use the official home team as the team of record, as do Gandar et al 
(1988) and most of the other studies.
28
   In order to identify real a priori home ground advantage, we define the variable HOME as follows: 
HOME equals 1 if this home team is from different city than the away team, and the ground is the 





or from two cities other than the ground’s city (i.e., no home advantage) or if this away team is from 
different city than the home team, and the ground is the home team's ground (i.e., away 
disadvantage).
29 Our data present 483 games (65.3%) where there is a real home ground advantage, of 
which the advantaged team won 304 games (62.9%).
30
      Our home teams win 72 percent of their games outside Victoria in 2001-2004, 49 percent in 
Melbourne, 60 percent in Geelong, and 63 percent in all games, which compares with the 58 percent 
as reported by both Stefani & Clarke (1992) for 1980-1989 and Brailsford et al (1995) for 1987-1995, 
and the 60 percent by Clarke (2005) for 1980-1998. But it should be noted that we refer to real home 
teams, whereas the other papers (except Clarke, 2005) report for official home teams.  
   Approximately 34 percent of the games during 2001-2004 (in both markets) were played on neutral 
grounds, where neither team has any home ground advantage. We will use this category, being 
uncontaminated by home ground advantage considerations, to show the presence or absence of 
favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog biases. 
 
4. Measuring weak efficiency: Econometric tests and Betting systems 
 
4.1 Econometric Tests 
 
   Before proceeding to list other difficulties, it will prove useful to define some terms. Let LINE 
denote the point spread in the bookmaker's betting line and PS denote the actual point spread between 
the two teams (defined in a way that is consistent with the definition of LINE, i.e., according to the 
official home team), and let WIN denote the actual winner in the game (defined as a variable equal to 
1 for the winning team, 0 for the losing team and 0.5 for draws). Further, let: 
 
) 1 ( 1 odds PRICE + =  
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   If bettors use the available information efficiently, then we would expect the point spread/fixed odds 
to be the best unbiased forecast of the game's outcome. Let i and j denote two different teams playing 
in game t. Then, in general, the Efficient Market Hypothesis requires that:  
 
(1a)   Median [PSijt│Ωt-1] = LINEijt          
(1b)   Median [P(WIN)ijt│Ωt-1] = NPRICEijt    
     
where Ωt-1 is the set of all information available to the bettor prior to the game.        
   Similarly to Stern (1991) in the NFL and Bailey & Clarke (2004) in the AFL (testing more than 100 
seasons, comprising 12462 games), we found that the distribution of the winning margin is not 
significantly different from the normal distribution at 5% significance level (equation 1a). We used 
four alternative tests for normality; Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia, Skewness/Kurtosis and 
Interquartile Range (IQR), and find that the above results are consistent between the different 
seasons.
31 The histogram of the winning margin for the line AFL betting market appears in Figure 1.  
 






























   Therefore the true outcome of a game in the line market can be modeled as a normal random 
variable with mean equal to the point spread, and equation (1a) implies that: 
 
(2a)  Et-1 [PSijt│Ωt-1] = LINEijt       
 
      Equations (1a-1b) and (2a) reflect the most general definition of efficiency, and a variety of 
efficiency tests have been performed based on equations (1a) and (2a), although equation (1b) remains 
untested in the context of team sports betting to the best of our knowledge. A natural test is based on 
the information contained in the set Ωt-1. In general, Ωt-1 will contain the current lines and odds, past 
lines and odds, past outcomes, known game conditions (e.g., ground, home team), past game 
statistics, other public information (e.g., injuries, referees), and private information. For the tests of 
weak-form market efficiency with which we are concerned, Ωt-1 should sensu stricto contain only 
prices, but it is conventional to include information regarding home ground advantage as well. 
   The basic statistical test of weak efficiency for the line betting market involves the following model: 
 
(3a)  ijt ijt ijt LINE PS ε β α + + =  
 
where α is a constant and εijt is an independently and identically distributed random error. Equation 
(3a) is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), as we test the linear relationship between point 
spreads and lines.  
      The parallel test in the fixed odds betting market is estimating P[WINijt│Ωt-1]. The expected 
winning team in a game is the one with P>0.5 and the relevant test involves the following 
specification, using OLS as well: 
 






   Owing to the relatively low number of observations in our data subsets, we used the non-parametric 
bootstrap method to test the power of all our tests. Using bootstrap (with 1,000 replications) for OLS 
in both betting markets, present estimated biases for the coefficients which are far less then 25% of 
the standard errors, thus, should not be a serious concern (Efron, 1982). Weak-form efficiency 
corresponds to the joint hypotheses with respect to equations (3a) and (3b) that α=0 and β=1.  
   Dare & Holland (2004) tried to disentangle the favorite/underdog and home team biases in the case 
of markets with very few games played on neutral grounds, as in most US sports. Due to the 
distinctive feature of the AFL, that many games are played on neutral grounds, we are able to suggest 
a different approach in order to identify the relevant biases, whereby we divide the data into subsets 
and test for all possible biases via separate regressions.
32 Results for line and fixed odds markets for 
the subsets of the data noted above are reported in Table 3a and Table 3b, respectively. 
 
Table 3a Weak efficiency estimates for the AFL line market 
Weak efficiency estimates for 2001-2004 AFL seasons for different subsets of the data. Each game is 
represented by one observation. The data are divided into the different game locations.  Standard errors 
(corrected for bias by bootstrapping with 1,000 replications) are in parentheses.  
ijt ijt ijt LINE PS ε β α + + =  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
A. Home teams in games played outside Victoria
LINE  1.22* 0.56*  0.71* 0.66*  0.88* 
  (0.22)  (0.23) (0.3) (0.31) (0.14) 
CONS  2.81 15.86*  12.72**  15.79* 9.29* 
  (5.76) (5.91)  (7.58)  (7.09)  (3.46) 
F (CONS=0, 
LINE=1)  0.83# 4.7  1.84#  2.84## 6.13 
Adj. R2  0.31 0.08  0.08  0.07  0.18 
No. of obs  62 67  62 66 257 
B. Home teams in games played in Melbourne
LINE  1.01* 0.69*  0.99*  1.17*  1* 
  (0.35) (0.26)  (0.29)  (0.32)  (0.13) 
CONS  4.06 -0.11  1.21  0.58  1.37 
  (9.89) (5.74)  (5.73)  (7.81)  (3.2) 
F (CONS=0, 
LINE=1)  0.20# 0.54#  0.02# 0.08#  0.09# 
Adj. R2  0.2 0.1 0.22  0.17 0.24 
No. of obs  38 42  35 34 149 
C. Home teams in games played in Geelong
LINE  0.95 2.05 -0.38 0.55 1.01* 
  (1.11) (2.67)  (0.77)  (0.66)  (0.39) 
CONS  -3.96 8.37 -11.66  24.29* 7.46 
  (16.13) (35.55)  (9.59)  (10.57)  (6.62) 
F (CONS=0, 





Table 3a (continued) 
Adj. R2  0.01 0.14 -0.08 0.03  0.14 
No. of obs  7 8  6  8 29 
D. Underdog teams in games played on neutral grounds
LINE  1.02* 0.61  1.87* 1.07* 1.07* 
  (0.49) (0.58)  (0.46)  (0.4)  (0.23) 
CONS  8.81 -5.59  7.26  -0.4  1.58 
  (11.17) (9.5)  (8.72) (8.48)  (4.68) 
F (CONS=0, 
LINE=1)  1.49# 0.4#  2.19# 0.09# 0.06# 
Adj. R2  0.07 0.02  0.18  0.1  0.09 
No. of obs  54 53  50 62 219 
* Significant at 5% level.      ** Significant at 10% level. 
# The null hypothesis that CONS=0 and LINE=1 cannot be rejected at 5% level (F2,30=3.32, F2,120=3.07). 
## The null hypothesis that CONS=0 and LINE=1 cannot be rejected at 10% level (F2,30=2.49, F2,120=2.35). 
 
Table 3b Weak efficiency estimates for the AFL fixed odds market 
Weak efficiency estimates for 2001-2004 AFL seasons for different subsets of the data. Each game is 
represented by one observation. The data are divided into the different game locations.  Standard errors 
(corrected for bias by bootstrapping with 1,000 replications) are in parentheses.  
ijt ijt ijt NPRICE WIN ε β α + + =  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
A. Home teams in games played outside Victoria
NPRICE  1.21* 0.54**  1.13*  0.38  0.91* 
  (0.27) (0.31)  (0.39)  (0.33)  (0.16) 
CONS  -0.12 0.46*  -0.01  0.51*  0.14 
  (0.17) (0.22)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.11) 
F (CONS=0, 
NPRICE=1)  0.29# 7.82  1.65# 3.29  5.78 
Adj. R2  0.21 0.04  0.15 <0.01 0.13 
No. of obs  69 70  70 69 278 
B. Home teams in games played in Melbourne
NPRICE  0.98* 1.13*  0.64  1.37*  1.02* 
  (0.37) (0.33)  (0.38)  (0.29)  (0.16) 
CONS  -0.02 -0.04  0.12  -0.21  -0.03 
  (0.26) (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.14)  (0.09) 
F (CONS=0, 
NPRICE=1)  0.13# 0.1#  0.5#  0.58# 0.24# 
Adj. R2  0.1 0.14 0.03  0.2  0.14 
No. of obs  46 43  44 41 174 
C. Home teams in games played in Geelong
NPRICE  1.78 1.2 -1.08  -  0.88 
  (1.21) (1.71)  (1.63)    (0.47) 
CONS  -0.53 -0.13  0.9  -  0.14 
  (0.7) (1.01) (0.78)    (0.27) 
F (CONS=0, 
NPRICE=1)  0.43# 0.02#  1.16#  -  0.42# 
Adj. R2  0.21 -0.03  0.03  -  0.06 
No. of obs  7 8  8 8
33 31 
D. Longshot  teams in games played on neutral grounds
NPRICE  1.06** 0.09  1.38*  0.61  0.78* 





Table 3b (continued) 
CONS  >-0.01 0.26  -0.16  0.11  0.06 
  (0.2) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16)  (0.1) 
F (CONS=0, 
NPRICE=1)  0.05# 1.73#  0.29# 0.33#  0.56# 
Adj. R2  0.03 -0.02  0.07  0.01  0.03 
No. of obs  63 63  62 67 255 
* Significant at 5% level.      ** Significant at 10% level. 
# The null hypothesis that CONS=0 and LINE=1 cannot be rejected at 5% level (F2,30=3.32, F2,120=3.07). 
## The null hypothesis that CONS=0 and LINE=1 cannot be rejected at 10% level (F2,30=2.49, F2,120=2.35). 
 
   We examine the neutral category, as it provides us with the only test for a pure favorite-longshot or 
favorite-underdog bias, uncontaminated by home ground considerations, since all other regressions 
confound this question. And indeed, the category results imply efficiency for all models during all 
years, thus there is no evident favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog bias.  
   Results for the other categories imply that the AFL gambling market is not consistently efficient, as 
we find biases in favor of home teams in games played outside Victoria. We reject the efficiency 
hypothesis for home teams at 5% level in the line market and in the win market during 2002, 2004 
and the whole period. We do not find such bias for games played in Melbourne or in Geelong (except 
2003, 2004 in the line market in Geelong).  
   The rejection of efficiency in the other categories could be a result of home team, favorite-longshot 
or favorite-underdog biases. However, since the neutral category leads us to reject the presence of 
favorite-longshot or favorite-underdog biases, we may conclude that any biases in the relevant AFL 
gambling markets relate to the presence of an apparent home ground advantage. 
 
4.2 Betting systems 
 
   To confirm the presence of the above-noted inefficiencies or otherwise, two simple betting systems 
were constructed in games played outside Victoria and in Geelong, both for line and fixed odds 
betting: (a) betting on all home teams and (b) betting on all neutral longshots/underdogs. The 






Table 4a Weak efficiency betting simulation for the AFL line market 
Betting simulation results for AFL games played during 2001-2004, for home teams in games played outside 










A. Home teams in games played outside Victoria
2001 124  62 -0.050  0.5  0.007* 
2002 134  67  0.159 0.033*  <0.001* 
2003 124  62  0.032  0.223  0.001* 
2004 132  66  0.117 0.07**  <0.001* 
2001-4 514  257  0.067  0.02* <0.001* 
B. Home teams in games played in Geelong
2001 14  7 -0.171 0.647  0.326 
2002 16  8 -0.065  0.5  0.193 
2003 12  6 -0.022  0.5  0.219 
2004 16  8  0.413  0.079**  0.004* 
2001-4 58  29  0.050  0.289 0.013* 
# S1 and S2 are, respectively, the significance levels for the null hypotheses of randomness and non-
profitability. The relevant test statistics are given by Z1 and Z2, respectively: 
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where W, L and B are, respectively, the number of wins, losses and total bets for a given scenario, and p=0.5. D 
is the mean dividend per scenario.
35
* Rejection of the hypothesis at 5% level. 
** Rejection of the hypothesis at 10% level. 
 
Table 4b Weak efficiency betting simulation for the AFL fixed odds market 
Betting simulation results for AFL games played during 2001-2004, for home teams in games played outside 









A. Home teams in games played outside Victoria
2001 124  62 -0.017 0.102 <0.001* 
2002 134  67  0.252 <0.001*  <0.001* 
2003 124  62  0.145 <0.001*  <0.001* 
2004 132  66  0.172 <0.001*  <0.001* 
2001-4 514  257  0.141  <0.001* <0.001* 
B. Home teams in games played in Geelong
2001 14  7 -0.330 0.647  0.317 
2002 16  8 -0.144  0.5  0.171 
2003 12  6  0.067 0.793  0.371 
2004 16  8  0.755 0.002*  - 
2001-4 58  29  0.103  0.177  0.002* 
#, *, ** See Table 4a. 
 
   Following Tryfos et al (1984), Gandar et al (1988) and Russo et al (1989), we test the significance 
of the results in two ways; first, a Z-test for the null hypothesis that the successful bet rates are 





stringent test is Tryfos et al's (1984) Z-test for the null hypothesis that a given scenario is unprofitable 
against the alternative that it is profitable. If we insistent stringently upon a rejection of the two null 
hypotheses, each at a five percent level of significance, there are two profitable betting systems in the 
line market; 2002 and the whole period outside Victoria, although season 2004 is also close at 7 
percent, and so is 2004 in Geelong at 8 percent. There are four such systems in the win market; 2002, 
2003, 2004 and the whole period outside Victoria. 2004 in Geelong has a highly significant S1, yet S2 
is missing, since as explained above, Geelong won all of its home games in 2004.
36  
   Nevertheless, it is important to note that during 2001-2003 Geelong finished 12
th, 9
th and 12
th out of 
16, respectively, on the AFL ladder, yet in 2004 they improved dramatically and finished 4
th. Thus, it 
may be that the results for Geelong in 2004 in Tables 4a and 4b are merely a case of the market 




   In this paper we have tested the weak-form efficiency of the line and fixed odds betting markets for 
the Australian Football League over the four seasons, 2001 through 2004, and tried to disentangle the 
two different biases of favorite-longshot/favorite-underdog on one hand, and home team on the other.  
   We have shown that there is neither a favorite-longshot nor a favorite-underdog bias in either of 
these markets once the possibility of a home ground advantage has been removed. We have done this 
by taking advantage of the fact that many games in the AFL are played on neutral grounds.  
   However, where the home ground advantage is sufficiently great (namely, in games played outside 
Victoria but involving visiting interstate teams), the home teams appear to be under-bet. Our results 
for the intermediate case of Geelong are inconclusive. 
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and favorite-longshot bias, as the latter term should not be applied to the point spread market at all because it 
refers to the possibility of different expected returns in different odds ranges, while in the point spread market 
wagers are relatively at similar odds.  
3 For thorough reviews of the literature, see Sauer (1998) and Vaughan Williams (1999).  
4 Busche & Hall (1988) in Hong Kong racetracks; Woodland & Woodland (1994), Gandar, Zuber, Johnson & 
Dare (2002) (in some extent) and Woodland & Woodland (2003), in the Major League Baseball (MLB); 
Swindler & Shaw (1995), in a second tier Texas racetrack; and Woodland & Woodland (2001), in the National 
Hockey League (NHL). Woodland & Woodland (2003), based on the fact that the proportion of underdog wins 
(beating the spread) in Gray & Gray (1997) and in Iskoe (1998) was 0.526 and 0.531, respectively, which is 
over half of their games, note that the reverse bias exists also in the National Football League (NFL) point 
spread market, yet there has been no empirical testing to support this finding.   
5 See, for example, Schwartz & Barsky (1977) in baseball, football, ice hockey and college basketball; Amoako-
Adu, Marmer & Yagil (1985) in the NFL; Golec & Tamarkin (1991) in the NFL and college football; Courneya 
& Carron (1992), listing 16 studies in different sports; Holder & Nevill (1997) in tennis and golf; Vergin & 
Sosik (1999) in the NFL; Gandar, Zuber & Lamb (2001) in the NBA and MLB; and Clarke (2005) in the AFL. 
6  For example, in the AFL there are open grounds and closed ones, which matters since the strength and 
direction of the wind plays an important role in the game, grounds are of different sizes (both in length and 
width) and different lighting, etc. 
7 See Bassett (1981), Dobra, Cargill & Meyer (1990) and Woodland & Woodland (1991). 
8 See Woodland & Woodland (1994). 
9 Currently, both types are available for most team sports, and one can even bet according to either of them with 
the same bookmaker. Nonetheless, empirical research comparing these two alternative methods, to the best of 





                                                                                                                                                         
 
10 See Stefani & Clarke (1992), who reported a home ground advantage for each of the AFL teams during 1980-
1989, and a bigger advantage for teams outside of Melbourne and for those that do not share a home ground. 
They were able to predict the correct winning team in 68 percent of games; Brailsford, Easton, Gray & Gray 
(1995), who reported a favorite-longshot bias in the AFL. Their success rate from betting on home teams during 
1987-1995 was 58 percent, yet the return rate was negative; Bailey & Clarke (2004), who use data from 1997-
2003 and present models predicting correctly up to 67 percent of winners, and producing betting profits of up to 
15 percent; and Clarke (2005) who demonstrated that individual clubs have home ground advantages to different 
degrees, non-Victorian teams having a larger advantage. His results lend support to the conclusion that crowd 
effects are the main determinant of home ground advantage.  
11 Initially, we divided the data set into two further categories, according to market expectations of the outcome; 
a priori close games and a priori one-sided games. Close games were defined as games in which the line (in its 
absolute value) is less than 17.5 (the median line over our sample). Nevertheless, since the results of the two 
categories do not differ significantly, we do not present them. Results are available upon request. 
12 For further information about the AFL, see its official website: http://www.afl.com.au.   
13 The Geelong Cats are the only team from Victoria which is not from Melbourne, since Geelong is located 70 
Km from Melbourne. Sydney and Brisbane are located 1,050 and 1,700 Km from Melbourne, respectively. 
14 In what is probably a unique, albeit bizarre, feature of the AFL, there are even games in which the official 
home team is playing an opponent with a genuine a priori home ground advantage! A recent example is 
provided in Round 9 of the 2005 season, when the Western Bulldogs, a Melbourne-based team, were the official 
home team in their game against the Sydney Swans, while the game was played in Sydney! 
15 The Melbourne Cricket Ground, opened in 1854, is the most famous Australian sporting venue, which serves 
throughout the winter as the home of Australian Rules football, and hosts the Grand Final. Regulations now 
limit the capacity to approximately 99,000, yet until the 1970s, more than 120,000 people were occasionally 
accomodated in the venue. For an early history of the M.C.G., see: K. Dunstan, The Paddock that Grew 
(Melbourne, 1962).   
16 It is interesting to ask why don’t teams from outside Victoria suffer when playing in Melbourne? Possible 
answers to this question are, first, that Victoria is the home of Australian football and so has fans of all teams. 
Second, since there are only three grounds in Melbourne, outside teams play there often whereas teams only 





                                                                                                                                                         
 
17 In contrast to the US market, the winning dividend per $1 point spread wager in the AFL is not fixed. The 
range of this dividend in our data of 2001-2004 was $1.78-$2.05, while in 66% of the games it was $1.9, and the 
average was $1.9 as well. We utilize in this paper the Australian usage of the term "dividend", which includes 
the original $1 bet. 
18  The percentage of winning bets (WP) necessary to break even, 52.63 percent, is obtained by setting the 
expected value of the random variable, a gamble WP * 0.9 + (1 – WP) * (-1), equal to zero.  
19 See, for further discussion, Vergin & Scriabin (1978), Gandar, Zuber, O'Brien & Russo (1988), and Dana & 
Knetter (1994).    
20  The range of actual payouts in our data set is $1.03-$10, while the average sum is $2.36. 
21 The average bookmakers' commission during our 2001-2004 data was 3.9%, while the average during 1998-
2004 was 5.5%. Bailey & Clarke (2004) noted that the commission could be as low as 2-3%.  
22 In the event the outcome is identical to the line, known as a "push" or a "no bet", the gambler's wager is 
refunded. In the very rare event where the outcome is a draw, the fixed odds bettor wins half the amount he 
would have won had his team won. Our data contains only 5 draws (0.7%). One can bet on a draw for most 
games at odds of 65 to 1, but this is part of an exotic category of bets.  Note that this seems a high price given 
that there are over 700 games in our sample!  
23 Nonetheless, Levitt (2004) noted that the adjustments in the line/odds are typically small and relatively 
infrequent; in the five days preceding an NFL game, the posted price changing an average of 1.4 times per 
game, and in 85 percent of those changes, the line moved by the minimum increment of one-half of a point. Yet, 
he noted that in horse racing, the odds set by bookmakers change more frequently. Avery & Chevalier (1999) 
noted that in 64 percent of NFL's games during 1983-1994 the line moved by half a point in the week prior to 
the game, and in 85 percent - by one point. Unfortunately, we do not have the relevant data for the AFL in order 
to shed more light on this.  
24 These methods include: Even money line (also known as Points), which is simply a "double or nothing" line 
bet, i.e., the bettor will either lose his stake or double it; Draw, where the bettor bets on the chance that the final 
result will be a draw; Point spread in 10 point gaps; 1-39 and 40+, where the bettor bets on the chance that the 
point spread will be between 1 and 39 points and 40 or above, respectively; Highest scoring quarter; First goal 





                                                                                                                                                         
 
Different medals; Premiership; Final eight; Highest placed Victorians or non-Victorians; Team to reach Grand 
Final; First coach to depart and many others. 
25 Although it should be noted, that not all data from previous seasons or games are available on-line today. 
26 It should be noted, that although there are around 30 registered interactive bookmakers that accept AFL bets, 
the odds and lines do not vary significantly.  
27 Response to a query from one of the authors by one of Australia’s leading bookmakers, Sportsbet Pty Ltd. 
28 See Golec & Tamarkin (1991) for a discussion about the different methods of choosing the team of record. 
29 For example, if the Kangaroos host Essendon in the M.C.G, HOME equals zero for both, since both are from 
Melbourne, and the ground’s city is Melbourne; If Frementale host Carlton in Subiaco Oval, HOME equals 1 for 
Frementale and 0 for Carlton, since Frementale are from Perth, as the Ground, and Carlton are from Melbourne.  
30 Compared to Clarke's (2005) findings of 80% and 60% (or 62% after 1987), respectively. 
31 We can not reject normality for the normalized price. 
32 Evidently, this is not applicable to most US sports, where there are almost no neutral grounds games. 
33 Statistical results for this category could not be obtained, since the home teams won all of these games. 
34 It should be noted that the betting simulations in Table 4a and Table 4b are using in-sample data, yet they 
suffice to make our point. Before recommending them as a basis for betting in practice, out-of-sample tests 
would obviously need to be conducted! 
35 This differs from Tryfos, Casey, Cook, Leger & Pylpiak (1984) and their successors, Gandar et al (1988) and 
Russo, Gandar & Zuber (1989), as they tested the NFL line betting market where the winning odds are fixed at 
10 to 11.  We expand Tryfos et al's (1984) test to include not only a constant dividend (as in the NFL line 
market), but also variety of fixed dividends (as in the AFL line and fixed odds markets).  
36 The equivalent results of Tryfos et al (1984) and Gandar et al (1988) were 3 profitable scenarios out of 70, 
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